max / makenotwork
| 1 | -- SyncKit Groups: invite links, so onboarding a member is one link instead of a |
| 2 | -- two-channel out-of-band exchange. |
| 3 | -- |
| 4 | -- Adding a member needs their account email AND their pasted identity public key |
| 5 | -- (`POST /groups/{id}/members`). That is two channels before anything works, and |
| 6 | -- it is the first thing a group's second user hits. An invitation carries a |
| 7 | -- one-use token: the invitee posts their public key against it instead of the |
| 8 | -- admin collecting the key by hand. |
| 9 | -- |
| 10 | -- The server is not a party to the key exchange, and this table is what keeps it |
| 11 | -- that way. It records two public keys and a pairing, which is exactly what |
| 12 | -- `add_member` already teaches the server. The Group Content Key never appears |
| 13 | -- here; the grant is still sealed client-side by the admin, after the admin |
| 14 | -- confirms the invitee's key fingerprint. Possession of a link is therefore an |
| 15 | -- invitation, not membership. |
| 16 | -- |
| 17 | -- Design: wiki synckit-groups-design, synckit-roadmap ("content always encrypted, |
| 18 | -- organization is the product": an invitation is coordination metadata, reachable |
| 19 | -- only through named endpoints, never as a general store). |
| 20 | |
| 21 | NOT EXISTS sync_group_invitations ( |
| 22 | id UUID PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT gen_random_uuid, |
| 23 | group_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES sync_groups(id) ON DELETE CASCADE, |
| 24 | |
| 25 | -- SHA-256 of the invite token, hex. The token itself exists only in the link |
| 26 | -- the admin sends, so a read of this table hands out no live invitations and |
| 27 | -- a leaked backup cannot be redeemed. Unique: the lookup on accept is by |
| 28 | -- hash, and two invitations sharing a token would be ambiguous. |
| 29 | token_hash TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE, |
| 30 | |
| 31 | inviter_user_id UUID NOT NULL REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE, |
| 32 | |
| 33 | -- Both set together when the invitee accepts; NULL while the invitation is |
| 34 | -- outstanding, because until then it names nobody. The public key is the |
| 35 | -- whole point of the round trip: it is what the admin seals the GCK to. |
| 36 | invitee_user_id UUID REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE, |
| 37 | invitee_pubkey TEXT, |
| 38 | accepted_at TIMESTAMPTZ, |
| 39 | |
| 40 | -- Set when the admin has confirmed the fingerprint and sealed the grant. |
| 41 | -- Terminal: the token opens nothing afterwards. Redemption is separate from |
| 42 | -- acceptance precisely so the admin's confirmation is a real gate rather than |
| 43 | -- a formality applied after the fact. |
| 44 | redeemed_at TIMESTAMPTZ, |
| 45 | |
| 46 | -- An admin cancelling an invitation they no longer want outstanding. |
| 47 | revoked_at TIMESTAMPTZ, |
| 48 | |
| 49 | -- An unredeemed invitation must stop being redeemable on its own. A token |
| 50 | -- that lives forever is a standing credential nobody remembers issuing. |
| 51 | expires_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL, |
| 52 | |
| 53 | created_at TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT NOW |
| 54 | ); |
| 55 | |
| 56 | -- The admin's pending-invitations panel: newest first, per group. |
| 57 | NOT EXISTS idx_sync_group_invitations_group |
| 58 | ON sync_group_invitations (group_id, created_at DESC); |
| 59 | |
| 60 | -- One outstanding invitation per (group, invitee). Partial, so it constrains only |
| 61 | -- live acceptances: an invitee who was invited, accepted, and was then removed can |
| 62 | -- be invited again, and revoked or redeemed rows never block a fresh invite. |
| 63 | NOT EXISTS idx_sync_group_invitations_pending_invitee |
| 64 | ON sync_group_invitations (group_id, invitee_user_id) |
| 65 | WHERE invitee_user_id IS NOT NULL AND redeemed_at IS NULL AND revoked_at IS NULL; |
| 66 |