//! Structured fuzz over the escape-sequence path, from PTY bytes to the grid.
//!
//! The failure this hunts is memory corruption in code that renders untrusted
//! bytes: everything a program prints reaches `Grid::place_char`, which writes
//! through `get_unchecked_mut` on the strength of invariants that the CSI
//! cursor, DECSTBM, scroll and resize paths maintain from those same bytes.
//!
//! It is registered as the `shop-vt` soak target and it does drive `shop-vt`,
//! but the fuzz crate lives beside `shop-grid` on purpose. `shop-vt` contains
//! no `unsafe` at all, so a target that fed it a no-op `Perform` could only
//! ever assert that it does not panic, which is the weakest thing a target can
//! say and reads as a defended path forever. The unchecked stores are one crate
//! downstream, and this is what puts them under the sanitizer.
//!
//! ## The oracle lives in the crate, not here
//!
//! Everything asserted is `shop_grid::oracle::check_bytes`. The committed
//! regression replay in `tests/regressions.rs` calls the same function on
//! stable, so a crash found here becomes a unit test by copying one file, and
//! neither side can drift into checking less than the other.
//!
//! ## Input shape
//!
//! The first two bytes choose the grid size, everything after them is the byte
//! stream. Committed seeds carry that header, so a seed is a capture with two
//! bytes in front of it rather than a different format.

#![no_main]

use libfuzzer_sys::fuzz_target;

fuzz_target!(|data: &[u8]| {
    shop_grid::oracle::check_bytes(data);
});